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This paper concerns an argument which, in this author’s experience, often 
comes up in discussions of “Why be moral?”1 Although initially tempting, the 
argument is in error. The error warrants attention not only because it spoils the 
argument but because it connects to a second error which is easy to make. Both 
errors concern the relation between desires and (normative) practical reasons. 
This paper discusses those errors and the argument in which the first error 
resides. 
1. 
That argument runs as follows. Every agent has at least some desires with this 
feature: one of the best ways for the agent to satisfy them is to be moral, where 
“being moral” involves habitually doing those deeds—those outward deeds, 
anyway—of kindness, honesty, fairness, and so forth that morality demands. 
For many people the desire to live morally has that feature; for others, only the 
desire to avoid punishment has it. At any rate, everyone has desires with the 
feature in question, meaning that every agent, even the sociopath, has desires 
that provide practical reasons—pro tanto reasons, at least—for the agent to live 
morally.2  
Obviously, this argument has modest aims. It does not purport to show that 
everyone has conclusive reasons to be moral. Even so it has importance, for it 
contradicts what many philosophers believe: that some people have no rational 
requirement, not even a minimal or defeasible one, to be moral.3 Also, there is 
                                                                  
1 That is, in conversations about “Why be moral?” Only occasionally does the argument, or a close 
cousin of it, appear in print. For an example see Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review, 
vol. 95 (1986), pp. 163–207, at p. 202 n. 39. (Railton seems to find the argument he mentions successful 
but uninteresting. I, on the other hand, find the argument I discuss interesting but unsuccessful.) 
2 Two remarks: First, this paper follows a contemporary trend by using “pro tanto” rather than “prima 
facie” to indicate actual but defeasible requirements or reasons. The term “prima facie” is potentially 
misleading given its literal sense. Second, any practical reason referred to in this paper is a pro tanto 
reason, rather than a conclusive reason, unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Most philosophers, including those who advance the above argument, assume that insofar as a person 
has a reason to φ the person has a pro tanto requirement of (practical) rationality to φ. This paper follows 
suit. One reason it does so emerges in section 4; another is that the assumption is eminently plausible. 
(E.g., to deny it is to deny, in effect, that a person rationally ought to do whatever that person has most 
reason to do.) Worth noting, however, is that the assumption has a few challengers. Those challengers 
contend that even if there is a good reason for an agent, A, to φ and absolutely no reason for A not to φ, and 
even if A knows this, A may have no requirement of rationality, not even a minimal or defeasible one, to φ. 
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something independently interesting, something heartening or reassuring, about 
the view that even the sociopath has some reason to be moral—a reason, 
moreover, to which indifference is impossible. The reasons to which the 
argument refers derive from desires, and it’s conceptually impossible to be 
indifferent to one’s own desires. Moreover, to have reasons that derive from 
those desires is to have reasons which, given the right conditions, could grow 
into weighty or even decisive reasons.  
The argument has further virtues. For instance, unlike some arguments of 
its kind it does not rest on the premise that some desires, particularly the desire 
for happiness, are shared by everyone. The problems with that premise are well 
known. Unless “happiness” denotes pleasure, absence of misery, or something 
closely similar it is not likely that everyone wants happiness. But if “happiness” 
denotes pleasure, absence of misery, or something of that kind it is a poor 
choice of terms, for it has moral overtones that “pleasure” and “absence of 
misery” lack. The notion of a happy person suggests, among other things, a 
person who is moral to some degree.  
So the argument has some virtues. Nevertheless it fails. This paper shows 
this, though not by challenging the (plausible) view that desires are a source of 
practical reasons. Even with that view granted, the argument breaks down. This 
is shown in sections 2 through 4; meantime, the argument is clarified. 
It will help to state the argument step by step, ignoring no tacit step. Also, 
it will serve fairness to assume that any desire to which the argument refers—
indeed, any desire to which this paper refers—is such that no one who shares it 
has cause to ignore, alter, or extinguish it (e.g., it is neither irrational nor based 
on misinformation).4  
Here, then, is the argument: 
(1) Every agent, A, has at least one desire with this feature: living morally 
is one of the best ways for A to satisfy it.  
(2) If φing is one of the best ways for A to satisfy one of A’s desires, that 
desire provides a reason for A to φ.  
Therefore,  
(3) Every agent, A, has at least one desire that provides a reason for A to 
live morally.  
Two comments are called for. The first, which pertains to steps (2) and (3), 
concerns the potentially misleading phrase “provides a reason for A to φ.” To 
say that a desire “provides” a reason for A to φ is to say, not that the desire itself 
                                                                                                                                                              
For a recent example of this position see Joshua Gert, “Practical Rationality, Morality, and Purely 
Justificatory Reasons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 37 (2000), pp. 227–43. For an argument 
against the position see Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), p. 152.  
4 To cover all the bases, a further assumption is made: that any sentence of the form “A has no cause to 
ignore, alter, or extinguish x” is short for “A has no cause to ignore, alter, or extinguish x; also, A has no 
cause to ignore x, no cause to alter x, and no cause to extinguish x.”  
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is such a reason, but that because A has that desire a fact exists which counts as 
a reason for A to φ. Very likely, that fact refers to the desire in question, but 
that’s not the key point. The key point is that A’s possession of the desire brings 
into being a fact which constitutes a reason for A to φ. 
Second, some points are in order about some expressions used from here 
on. The first expression is “to φ,” as it occurs in the terms “reason to φ” and 
“reason for A to φ.” Unless otherwise noted “to φ” has its ordinary sense; in 
particular, it is not elliptical for “to φ or ψ (or ...).” Perhaps this goes without 
saying; even so it is worth highlighting. It has relevance later. 
The next two expressions are “A has no reason to φ” and “there is no 
reason for A to φ.” As used in this paper they mean, not that A has reasons not 
to φ, but simply that nothing exists that qualifies as a reason for A to φ. 
Similarly, the claim that a particular desire provides no reason for A to φ means 
that the desire brings into being no fact, no putative reason, that counts as a 
reason for A to φ. Finally, the expressions “reason to φ” and “A has a reason to 
φ,” as they are used here, mean the same, respectively, as “reason for A (the 
relevant agent) to φ” and “there is a reason for A to φ.”  
2. 
As indicated earlier, the argument for (3) fails. Its downfall is the phrase “one of 
the best ways.” Before defending this point, however, it’s worth showing that 
the use of that phrase, particularly in place of “the best way,” is no silly mistake. 
It has its advantages, even if it ultimately brings problems. 
If “one of the best ways” is replaced with “the best way” premise (1) 
becomes this:  
(1´) Every agent, A, has at least one desire with this feature: living morally 
is the best way for A to satisfy it.  
The problem here is that (1´) is not very plausible. Think of the sociopath,5 and 
think of those few desires which, on the one hand, the sociopath can be 
                                                                  
5 The sociopath is usually conceived as a person who, by common standards, is rational, intelligent, 
and autonomous, but devoid of a conscience and of “pro-social” (and many related) desires and emotions 
(e.g., empathy and compassion). This understanding differs from, but does not clash with, the richer, 
technical characterization of the sociopath. This technical characterization is worth pausing over, partly 
because many philosophers use the term “sociopath” without either defining it or mentioning the psycho-
logical literature on it. In the first place, a sociopath, technically defined, is not the same as a person with 
antisocial personality disorder. Unlike the latter, the sociopath (or psychopath, to use an alternative term) 
is generally characterized not just by a cluster of behaviors, but also by a cluster of personality traits. In his 
book Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (New York: Guilford, 
1993), psychologist Robert D. Hare lists twelve “key symptoms” of sociopathy. (See p. 34 of that book, 
and chaps. 3 and 4 in general. See also pp. 24–25 for the contrast between sociopathy and antisocial 
personality disorder.) Hare characterizes the sociopath’s personality as (i) emotionally shallow, (ii) devoid 
of empathy, (iii) glib and superficial, (iv) egocentric and grandiose, (v) deceitful and manipulative, and 
(vi) devoid of guilt or remorse. He characterizes the sociopath’s lifestyle and behavior as (vii) impulsive, 
(viii) excessively excitement-oriented, and (ix) deficient in inhibitory controls; also as marked by (x) a 
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expected to share and which, on the other, the sociopath could satisfy by living 
morally. Candidates include the desire to avoid punishment and the desire not to 
be frustrated too often in one’s pursuits. Candidates do not include the desire 
for approval, the desire for friendship, or even the desire for happiness—unless, 
of course, “happiness” is purged of any moral overtones by defining it as, say, 
pleasure or the absence of pain.  
Now, having identified the requisite sort of desires, consider this question: 
Is there not even one sociopath (the Zodiac Killer, perhaps)6 for whom those 
desires are no better served by living morally than by living as a clever 
immoralist? An immoralist is a person who deliberately appears to be morally 
upright but never refrains from immoral deeds if he thinks he can profit 
undetected by doing them.7 A clever immoralist is an immoralist who is vastly 
skilled both at going undetected in his immoral deeds and at concealing, 
whenever necessary, the motives and character from which those deeds spring. 
And the question, again, is whether there is not even one sociopath for whom 
the identified desires would be no better served by living morally than by living 
as a clever immoralist.  
The answer, almost surely, is that at least a few sociopaths would find 
(indeed, do find) life as a clever immoralist an optimal way to satisfy the 
identified desires. (This is partly because they have an ability that most people 
lack: the ability to be a clever immoralist.) This is so even if—indeed, 
especially if—different ways of satisfying a desire are ranked not only by how 
well they satisfy that desire but by how congenial they are to the agent’s other 
desires. (Many sociopaths, e.g., the Zodiac Killer, have desires that cannot be 
satisfied except through immoral behavior.)8 So (1´) is not sufficiently plausible 
to make the argument for (3) forceful.  
By now, two objections may have come to mind. Each can be expressed as 
a question. First, what about the risks involved in being an immoralist? Isn’t it 
                                                                                                                                                              
lack of responsibility, (xi) early behavioral problems, and (xii) antisocial behavior in adulthood. Hare dubs 
(i) through (xii) “key,” rather than “exclusive,” symptoms because, as he often indicates, sociopaths have 
other traits as well. For example, “psychopathy [or sociopathy] cannot be understood in terms of 
traditional views of mental illness. Psychopaths are not disoriented or out of touch with reality, nor do they 
experience the delusions, hallucinations, or intense subjective distress that characterize most other mental 
disorders. Unlike psychotic individuals, psychopaths are rational and aware of what they are doing and 
why. Their behavior is the result of choice, freely exercised.... Psychopaths are generally well satisfied 
with themselves.... They see nothing wrong with themselves, experience little personal distress, and find 
their behavior rational, rewarding, and satisfying” (ibid., pp. 22, 195).  
6 The Zodiac Killer was a serial murderer in the 1960’s who took great pleasure in planning and 
committing his murders and in taunting the police. Despite an enormous manhunt and an investigation that 
spanned many years, this killer was never apprehended and is now widely presumed to have died, decades 
after the murders, of natural causes. By all accounts the Zodiac Killer was an extreme sociopath, clearly 
one of considerable intelligence and ingenuity.  
7 Here “profit” means, not “materially profit,” but “profit in any way.” Many criminals “profit” from 
their crimes solely by receiving emotional thrills from them.  
8 Worth mentioning is that such desires are shared by people other than sociopaths, and are more 
varied than many people imagine. For a useful treatment of this subject see Jack Katz, Seductions of 
Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil (New York: Basic Books, 1988). 
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just a matter of luck if an immoralist entirely escapes punishment? The answer 
is that it’s naive to think that the many sociopathic assassins, con artists, and 
petty thieves who have committed crime after crime without being caught have 
simply been lucky—that is, that although they have avoided capture they have 
been irrational in their choices, given the risks they have taken. This is naive 
because, just as people exist whose abilities enable them to walk tightropes with 
little risk of falling, people exist whose abilities enable them to reject the moral 
life—indeed, to reject it in favor of a life of predatory crime—with little risk of 
capture. The annals of crime furnish proof that such people exist. And when 
such people have sociopathic personalities, meaning that they lack the desires 
most commonly at the root of moral behavior, it is quite unlikely that their 
desires include some that are better served by living morally than by living in 
any nonmoral way.  
Second, what about the many philosophical arguments for the view that it 
“pays” to be good? That is, what about those arguments designed to show that 
because the satisfaction of a person’s desires depends on that person’s 
interactions with others—for instance, on how others react to the person’s 
character—it can pay the person to develop a settled disposition to act morally? 
The answer is that even the best of these arguments trade on assumptions that 
are not true of every agent. David Gauthier’s argument is perhaps the best of the 
lot, but it rests on the assumption that the people to whom it applies are 
translucent: their character is not inscrutable; they tend to be seen for what they 
are by the people with whom they interact.9 This is a limitation because some 
people are not translucent; others are not translucent to the degree necessary for 
Gauthier’s argument.10 (Gauthier says nothing to disprove this; he provides no 
evidence that everyone is translucent.) So Gauthier’s argument is no threat to 
the point that premise (1´), considered as a substitute for (1), is not plausible 
enough to make the argument for (3) forceful.  
It is understandable, then, that the advocates of the argument for (3) opt for 
(1) rather than (1´). That is, they use “one of the best ways” rather than “the best 
way.” Of course, “one of the best ways” admits of multiple readings, some of 
which, no doubt, are less fair than others to the argument for (3). Suppose, for 
instance, that “one of the best ways” means “one of the top five ways.” Then 
even if (1) is plausible, (2) is vulnerable to an objection: If φing is a worse way 
than four others for A to satisfy a desire, how can that desire provide any reason 
for A to φ? Perhaps the desire provides a reason for A to act, but the act in 
question cannot be that of φing. This is true even if φing is the fifth best way, 
and hence “one of the best ways,” for A to satisfy the desire. 
                                                                  
9 David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Gauthier’s 
discussion of translucency is on pp. 174–78 of this book.  
10 See Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “Deception and Reasons to be Moral,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 26 (1989), pp. 113–22.  
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In light of this objection, “one of the best ways” is hereafter read such that 
φing is one of the best ways for A to satisfy a desire just in case A’s φing would 
not only satisfy that desire but satisfy it at least as well as any other act 
available to A. Arguably, this reading shields (2) from objections of the kind 
just stated, yet without making (1) so contentious that it becomes, like (1´), too 
implausible to serve its purpose. 
Unfortunately, this reading does not solve the problem. Even if it shields 
(1) from potent objections,11 it does not do the same for (2). Indeed, it is no 
kinder to (2) than the reading it purports to improve upon. The fact that φing is 
as good a way as any other for A to satisfy one of A’s desires does not ensure 
that that desire provides a reason for A to φ.  
In this author’s experience, some philosophers are quick to grant this point 
about (2); others are quick to reject it. Philosophers in the first camp raise an 
objection to (2) that resembles the one raised a bit ago. They contend that for all 
the antecedent of (2) says, φing is just one way, no better than many others, for 
A to satisfy the desire to which (2) refers. So although that desire provides a 
reason for A to act, the act in question is not necessarily that of φing. Hence (2) 
is not true, though it may seem true because it is almost true. Were (2) revised 
just slightly, by replacing “one of the best ways” with “the best way,” (2) would 
be true.  
Philosophers in the second camp contend that even if φing is just one way, 
no better than many others, for A to satisfy the desire referred to in (2), A 
nevertheless has, owing to that desire, a reason to φ. After all, given that by 
φing A could satisfy that desire, the act of φing has a virtue that many other 
actions lack. It promises to fulfill one of A’s desires, whereas many other 
actions do nothing for A. Thus, other things being equal (i.e., assuming that 
those other actions, as well as the act of φing, have no further properties that 
could create reasons either for or against A’s doing them), A has more reason to 
φ than to perform one of those other acts. But then A must have some reason, if 
only a minimal one, to φ. That reason can only come from the desire that A’s 
φing would fulfill, namely, the desire to which (2) refers.12  
The resolution of this issue lies in showing, through a sufficiently detailed 
argument, that (2) is not true. To do this is not only to refute the argument for 
(3) but to correct an error, an easy one to make, about the conditions under 
which a desire yields reasons for the acts that fulfill it. This is because (2) 
follows from (4), and (4) is an easy error to fall into.13  
                                                                  
11 This is a big “if.” Although (1) is less contentious than (1´), considerations of the kind that cast 
doubt on (1´)—considerations about the sociopath’s desires and the available ways of satisfying them—
very likely cast doubt on (1). But this point will be set aside.  
12 Worth observing is that if this argument were sound, (2) would be true even if “one of the best 
ways” meant “one of the top fifty ways.” Arguably, this observation is a tip-off that something is amiss in 
the argument. More on this later.  
13 That error (4) is easy to fall into is revealed by the frequency with which philosophers fall into it—
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(4) If φing is a way for an agent, A, to satisfy one of A’s desires, that 
desire provides a reason for A to φ.14 
Statement (2) is the first of the two errors mentioned at the start of this 
paper; statement (4) is the second. The two are related because (4) entails (2); 
hence, to refute (2) is to refute (4). More on this later; the task for now is to 
refute (2).  
3. 
Premise (2) can be refuted by showing the following to be possible:  
(5) φing is one of the best ways for at least one agent, A, to satisfy one of 
A’s desires. Even so, that desire provides no reason for A to φ.  
Statement (5) could not be true if (2) were true, for the very point of (2) is that 
(5) is not possible. The proof that (5) could be true, and hence that (2) is false, 
begins with two assumptions and two facts. The assumptions are (6) and (7); 
the facts are (8) and (9). 
(6) φing is one of the best ways for at least one agent—Alf, say—to 
satisfy at least one of his desires, D. Also, Alf has exactly two 
different, equally good ways of satisfying D. Alf can satisfy D not 
only by φing but by ψing. These ways are equally good not only in 
being equally capable of satisfying D but in being equally congenial 
to Alf’s other desires.15  
                                                                                                                                                              
or if not into it, then into errors that differ from it only in small details (on this see note 14). Some 
examples: “If P’s doing A is a means to something which P wants, P has a reason to do A” (William David 
Solomon, “Moral Reasons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 12 [1975], pp. 331–39, at p. 331). “P 
has reason to perform any action A that promises to fulfill one of his desires” (Max Hocutt, Grounded 
Ethics [New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2000], p. 81). “Means/end considerations always count as prima 
facie reasons.... If it’s a fact that A could satisfy his desire for E by doing D, then that fact is a reason for A 
to do D....” (John J. Tilley, “Motivation and Practical Reasons,” Erkenntnis, vol. 47 [1997], pp. 105–27, at 
p. 110). “Imagine that John would like to offend James and that reminding James of a certain incident 
would offend him. Therefore, there is a reason for John to remind James of the incident” (Joseph Raz, 
Practical Reason and Norms [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990], p. 33). “I want to cheer 
[Susan] up and think meeting her would do this…. Since I know that taking the Times Square bus would 
enable me to meet Susan, I … have a desiderative reason for taking that bus. I have this reason for taking 
the bus as soon as I desire to cheer up Susan and see taking the bus as a means to that end….” (Michael 
Bratman, “Intention and Means-End Reasoning,” Philosophical Review, vol. 90 [1981], pp. 252–65, at p. 
252). The argument this paper presents against (4) applies, perhaps with minor embellishments, to each of 
the remarks just quoted. (More on this in section 5—in the discussion of thesis (4´).) Thus, the authors of 
those remarks indeed fall into an error. This is not to say, however, that they are committed to the error. It 
is not to say, in other words, that they would ruin their arguments if they revised their prose to remove the 
error. They could do the latter with little trouble. For instance, Solomon could do it by replacing “a means” 
with “the only means.”  
14 Usually, the consequent of (4) says merely that A has a reason to φ; it says nothing about the source 
of that reason. In such cases, however, it’s implicit that A’s reason derives from the desire to which (4) 
refers.  
15 Why include this final sentence in (6)? Because without it an assertion made shortly—that (6) 
guarantees (11)—is debatable.  
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(7) Alf cannot both φ and ψ. Indeed, Alf cannot φ without intentionally 
not ψing. (Also, this stems from no defect on Alf’s part.)  
(8) If Alf cannot φ without intentionally not ψing, then any reason for Alf 
to φ is a reason for Alf not to ψ. To put this another way, if Alf cannot 
φ without intentionally not ψing, then if any putative reason, R, is not 
a reason for Alf not to ψ, it is not a reason for Alf to φ. 
(9) If R is a reason for Alf to either φ or ψ,16 then R is not a reason for Alf 
not to ψ. 
As just indicated, although (6) and (7) are assumptions, (8) and (9) are 
facts. To see that (8) is a fact imagine someone saying, “There’s a reason for me 
to leave town tonight, but there’s no reason for me not to remain in town all 
night.” This statement is absurd because no one (at least no psychologically 
ordinary person) can intentionally leave town without intentionally not 
remaining in town. Hence, any reason for a person to perform the first action is 
a reason for the person not to perform the second. 
To see that (9) is a fact suppose Alf wants to drive home and can do so 
equally well by taking either Route 1 or Route 2, the only two routes available. 
Alf has an instrumental reason to either take Route 1 or take Route 2. Clearly, 
that reason is not a reason for Alf not to take Route 2. If it were, it certainly 
could not be a reason for Alf to either take Route 1 or take Route 2.  
The task now is to draw conclusions from (6) through (9). (6) clearly 
entails this:  
(10) φing is one of the best ways for Alf to satisfy D.  
Premise (6) also ensures that, owing to D, Alf has a reason to act. In other 
words, given (6), Alf cannot help but to have at least one practical reason, 
namely, a reason that derives from D. (6) also ensures that any reason D 
provides Alf is a reason for Alf to either φ or ψ. For instance, given an 
assumption stated earlier, any reason D provides Alf cannot be a reason for Alf 
to ignore, alter, or extinguish D. Nor can it be a reason for Alf to φ-but-eschew-
ψing, given that φing is no better than ψing as a means of satisfying D.  
In sum, (6) guarantees this:  
(11) D provides Alf with at least one practical reason. The practical 
reason(s), R, that D provides Alf is a reason for Alf to either φ or ψ.  
With (11) established the remainder of the proof goes quickly. Premises (7) 
and (8) entail that if R, the reason(s) D provides Alf, is not a reason for Alf not 
to ψ, then R is not a reason for Alf to φ. And (9) and (11) entail that R is not a 
reason for Alf not to ψ. From these two entailments it follows that R, the 
                                                                  
16 Please excuse the split infinitives in this paper; their purpose is to ensure precision. In fact, to 
remove them would be to alter considerably the meaning of the relevant sentences.  
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reason(s) D provides Alf, is not a reason for Alf to φ. This is to say that D 
provides no reason for Alf to φ. The latter conclusion, combined with (10), 
entails that  
(12) φing is one of the best ways for Alf to satisfy D. Even so, D provides 
no reason for Alf to φ.  
Statement (12) entails (5). Thus, it’s possible that (5) is true. More fully, 
since (5) follows from premises which, taken individually or collectively, are 
either true or possibly true,17 (5) could be true. This means that (2) is false; 
consequently, the argument for (3) is unsound. 
4. 
Proponents of the argument for (3) have some possible replies. The first is that 
although (2) is indeed false, it would not be if “one of the best ways” were 
replaced with “the best way.” But this reply fails. Although the revised version 
of (2) is true, combining it with (1) does not establish (3). To remedy that 
problem (1´) must be substituted for (1). But as already shown, (1´) is not 
plausible enough to make the argument for (3) successful.  
The next reply is this: Taken as a generalization, (2) is indeed open to 
disproof. However, if “φing” stands for living morally and “ψing” stands for 
living nonmorally, (6) or (7) is false and hence the objection to (2) fails. To put 
this another way, if the argument for (3) is interpreted properly, if “φing” is read 
not as a variable or an unknown but as a stand-in for “living morally,” then (6) 
through (9) must be interpreted accordingly. They must be interpreted, that is, 
so that “φing” and “ψing” denote, respectively, living morally and living 
nonmorally. Although this does not affect facts (8) and (9), it does affect 
assumptions (6) and (7). At least one of those assumptions is false; hence, the 
objection to (2) is unsound.  
The first thing to be said here is that if (6) or (7) is false, (6) alone is the 
falsehood. In other words, if “φing” stands for living morally and “ψing” for 
living nonmorally, (7) holds its ground. It does so because, presumably, the 
argument for (3) uses “living morally” in such a way that Alf cannot live 
morally without intentionally not living nonmorally. If the argument does that, 
it dovetails with common usage and, especially, with the usage standard in 
replies to “Why be moral?” So (7) is not false if “φing” and “ψing” denote, 
respectively, living morally and living nonmorally. 
Thus, the reply is committed to the claim that if “φing” stands for living 
morally and “ψing” for living nonmorally, (6) is false. Fairness to that claim 
requires that its consequent be taken to mean, not that just any component of (6) 
is false, but that the middle component of (6) is false. The middle component is 
the thought expressed by the second two sentences in (6). (“Also, Alf has 
                                                                  
17 The possibly true ones are assumptions (6) and (7); the true ones are facts (8) and (9). 
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exactly two different, equally good ways of satisfying D. Alf can satisfy D not 
only by φing but by ψing.”) To deny any other sentence in (6) is useless—
useless, that is, to the proponents of the argument for (3). For instance, if “φing” 
stands for living morally, to deny the first sentence in (6) is to deny premise (1). 
Obviously, this is to undercut the argument for (3).  
But now comes a problem. What is the best interpretation of the claim that 
if “φing” stands for living morally and “ψing” for living nonmorally, the middle 
component of (6) is false? Of the available interpretations, most are not feasible, 
at least not for supporters of the argument for (3). For instance, it will not do to 
read the claim to mean this: for Alf, living morally (φing) is worse than living 
nonmorally (ψing) as a way to satisfy D. This reading would make the claim 
clash with the first sentence in (6), a sentence the supporters of the argument for 
(3) wish to preserve. The only feasible reading of the claim is this: for Alf, 
living morally is better than living nonmorally as a way to satisfy D.  
The problem now becomes clear. Given the reading just stated, the claim 
being examined—that if “φing” stands for living morally and “ψing” for living 
nonmorally, the middle component of (6) is false—amounts to this: For Alf, 
living morally is better than living nonmorally as a way to satisfy D, where D is 
a desire of Alf’s with this feature: living morally is one of the best ways for Alf 
to satisfy it.  
This statement is reminiscent of (1´), and, depending on who Alf happens 
to be, is just as implausible. Suppose that Alf is a sociopathic con artist, in 
which case D most likely is, or is akin to, the desire to avoid punishment. 
Suppose further that Alf is only a petty con artist (the kind rarely reported to the 
police); also, that Alf is enormously clever. Then it’s unlikely that for Alf, 
living morally is better than living nonmorally as a way to satisfy D.   
The third reply to the objection contends that the expression “x (a desire) 
provides a reason for A to φ” has two senses. For one of them, that expression 
asserts a truth just in case, owing to A’s possession of x, something (a fact) 
counts as a reason for A to φ, where “reason for A to ...” and “to φ” have their 
usual meanings. For instance, “reason for A to ...” denotes a fact which creates 
(so to speak) a pro tanto requirement of rationality to which A is subject; and 
“to φ” is not elliptical for “to φ or ψ.” For this sense of “x provides a reason for 
A to φ” the objection to (2) succeeds. But the expression “x provides a reason 
for A to φ” has a second sense. For that sense, to say that x provides a reason for 
A to φ is to say, roughly, that owing to x A is rationally permitted to φ. More 
precisely, it is to say that because A has x, there is a fact which, if known to A 
and unopposed by other practical reasons, results in A’s being rationally 
authorized to φ. For this sense of the expression the objection to (2) fails. For 
example, one of its steps, step (11), implies something that the objection 
explicitly, and of necessity, denies: that D provides a reason for Alf to φ. Step 
(11) asserts that D provides a reason for Alf to either φ or ψ; and any reason of 
that kind is a fact which, if known to Alf and unopposed by other practical 
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reasons, results in Alf’s being rationally authorized to φ. (Interestingly, this is 
true whether (11) employs “D provides ... a reason for Alf to ...” in the first of 
its two senses or in the second.) So (11) implies that D provides a reason for Alf 
to φ in the second sense of “D provides a reason for Alf to φ.” Thus, as long as 
(2) uses “x provides a reason for A to φ” in the second of its two senses, in 
which case the objection to (2) must do the same, the objection to (2) is fatally 
flawed.  
This reply is weak because, even if “x provides a reason for A to φ” has 
these two senses (rather than just the first), the second sense, unlike the first, is 
uncongenial to the argument for (3). That argument is of little interest unless (3) 
entails that everyone has (or would have, given suitable knowledge) a pro tanto 
requirement of rationality to be moral. If (3) entails merely that everyone has a 
pro tanto authorization of rationality to be moral, then (3) packs little punch. It 
says nothing very surprising; also, it fails to ensure, as its advocates mean it 
to,18 that everyone rationally ought, ceteris paribus, to be moral. (From the fact 
that a person is rationally authorized to do something it does not follow that the 
person rationally ought to do it.) In short, the argument for (3) is in a fix unless 
it entails that everyone has a requirement of rationality to be moral.  
But it entails no such thing if the final phrase in its conclusion—“at least 
one desire that provides a reason for A to live morally”—has the second of its 
two (purported) senses. If the phrase has that sense it means simply this: “at 
least one desire A’s possession of which produces a fact which, if known to A 
and unopposed by other reasons, results in A’s being rationally authorized to 
live morally.” This implies nothing about a rational requirement for A to live 
morally; it coheres with the view that A has no rational requirement, not even a 
pro tanto one, of that kind.  
So the third reply is unsatisfactory. A fourth reply, equally unsatisfactory, 
goes as follows.19 Premises (6) through (9) indeed entail that D provides no 
reason for Alf to φ. Also, if those premises are altered just slightly, by replacing 
“φ” with “ψ” and vice versa (in which case the new premises are no less 
plausible than the old), they entail that D provides no reason for Alf to ψ. But 
then something has gone wrong, because those two entailments, combined, 
contradict statement (11). They do so because they imply that D fails to provide 
a reason for Alf to either φ or ψ. Just imagine someone asserting “D provides no 
reason for Alf to φ, and D provides no reason for Alf to ψ; even so, D provides 
a reason for Alf to either φ or ψ.” This assertion is contradictory, revealing that 
the conjunction with which it begins implies that, contrary to (11), D does not 
provide a reason for Alf to either φ or ψ. 
This reply invites two comments. First, it’s related to the third reply in this 
way: if “D provides a reason for Alf to ...” is assumed to have the second of the 
                                                                  
18 Recall note 3.  
19 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this objection.  
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two senses to which the third reply refers, then the assertion to which the fourth 
reply refers is indeed contradictory. It resembles the assertion “D does not 
authorize Alf to φ, and D does not authorize Alf to ψ; even so, D authorizes Alf 
to either φ or ψ.” 
Second, the assertion to which the fourth reply refers does not sound 
contradictory. It sounds odd, but to sound odd is not to sound contradictory. 
Nor is the oddness of an utterance always, or even usually, to be explained by 
the presence of a contradiction.20 So the reply yields no compelling evidence 
that in ordinary language the sentence “D provides a reason for Alf to ...” means 
something like “Because Alf has D, there is a fact which, if known to Alf and 
unopposed by other practical reasons, results in Alf’s being rationally 
authorized to ...” At any rate, the sentence cannot have that meaning in the 
argument for (3). (More exactly, the sentence form “x provides a reason for A to 
...” cannot have that meaning—or a kindred meaning, rather—in the argument 
for (3).) If the argument for (3) is to have the significance it is meant to have, 
“D provides a reason for Alf to ...” must mean something like this: “because Alf 
has D, there is a fact which, if known to Alf and unopposed by other practical 
reasons, results in Alf’s being rationally required to ...” But then the assertion to 
which the fourth reply refers is no more contradictory than this one: “D does 
not require Alf to φ, and D does not require Alf to ψ; even so, D requires Alf to 
either φ or ψ.”21 So the fourth reply fails. 
5. 
The objection in section 3 withstands the four replies. That objection is sound; 
the disproof of (2) succeeds. Even if “φing” stands specifically for living 
morally, the antecedent of (2) fails to ensure the consequent. That is, it fails to 
ensure that the desire to which it refers provides a reason for A to φ. Perhaps it 
ensures that the desire to which it refers provides a reason for A to either φ or ψ 
(where “ψing” stands for living nonmorally), but that fact does not help (2). Nor 
does it help the argument in which (2) occurs; little would be achieved by 
revising the argument in light of it. The claim that everyone has a reason to 
either live morally or live in some other way does not entail that everyone has a 
pro tanto requirement of rationality to live morally. But unless the argument for 
(3) entails that assertion, it does not merit the attention it has received here. 
Formulated and interpreted so that it merits that attention, it falls to the 
objection in section 3. 
                                                                  
20 See H. P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in The Logic of Grammar, ed. Donald Davidson and 
Gilbert Harman (Encino, CA: Dickenson), pp. 64–75.   
21 Interestingly, some people find this statement odd on a first hearing, though a little reflection shows 
it to be noncontradictory. This fact supports a point made a bit ago: that the oddness of a statement is no 
proof that the statement harbors a contradiction.  
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Before closing, three more points are in order. The first is that because (2) 
is false, (4) is false also. After all, (4) entails (2); so the disproof of (2) amounts 
to a disproof of (4). 
The second point concerns the authors cited in note 13. According to that 
note, those authors hold (4) or something like it. What most of them hold is this:  
(4´) If φing is a way for an agent, A, to satisfy one of A’s desires, then A 
has a reason to φ. 
If (4´) is elliptical for (4) it already stands refuted. If it is not elliptical for 
(4) it can be refuted in short order. To begin, note that because (4) is false, the 
following is a possible state of affairs: 
(13) φing is a way for at least one agent—Ann, say—to satisfy one of her 
desires, E. Even so, E provides no reason for Ann to φ.  
Now combine (13) with this assumption: “If E provides no reason for Ann 
to φ, then Ann has no reason to φ. For instance, Ann has no desire, aside from 
E, the satisfaction of which would be promoted by Ann’s φing.” This 
assumption, together with (13), entails this:  
(14) φing is a way for Ann to satisfy one of her desires. Even so, Ann has 
no reason to φ. 
Given that the steps from which (14) follows represent possible states of affairs 
(i.e., either they are true or they could be true, whether viewed individually or 
collectively), (14) does the same. But if (14) represents a possible state of 
affairs, (4´) is false.  
A possible reply is that (14) has an absurd consequence, revealing that 
something has gone wrong in the above argument. The second part of (14) says 
that Ann has no reason to φ. But the first part entails that, other things being 
equal, Ann would act rationally were she to φ. The result is the following 
absurdity: 
(15) Ann has no reason to φ; nevertheless, other things being equal, Ann 
would act rationally were she to φ.  
One problem with this reply is that (15) is not absurd. (15) is odd, but its 
oddness is no proof of absurdity.22 As evidence for this, note that the following 
is not absurd: 
                                                                  
22 And just why is (15) odd? Perhaps because the sentence “A has no reason to φ” is often used to mean 
not that A lacks a reason of this or that kind but that A has a reason—indeed, a conclusive reason—to 
refrain from φing. (Compare: “A has no business φing.” Normally, the intent of this statement is not that A 
lacks something but that A has something, namely, an obligation not to φ.) If the sentence were used that 
way in this paper, (15) would be absurd. Of course, it is not used that way in this paper. But because 
people sometimes use it that way, (15) has an odd ring.  
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(16) Ann has no reason to φ, but Ann does have a reason to either φ or ψ. 
Thus, other things being equal, Ann would act rationally were she to 
φ.  
If (15) were absurd (16) would be absurd, because (16) plainly entails (15). But 
(16) is not absurd; nor is it the least bit odd. And of course nothing is amiss in 
its first sentence. As shown earlier, a person can have a reason to either φ or ψ 
without having a reason to φ.  
The third point concerns the brief argument for (2) that emerged in section 
2. The key premise in that argument can be stated thus:  
(17) If φing has a virtue that many other actions lack—specifically, if φing 
promises to fulfill one of A’s desires, whereas many other actions do 
nothing for A—and if, further, not one of those actions, including the 
act of φing, has any other properties that could create reasons either 
for or against A’s doing it, then A has more reason to φ than to do one 
of those other, useless actions.  
This premise, combined with a few others the truth of which is secure, entails 
(2). Since (2) is false, (17) is false. 
Even so, (17) sounds plausible. Most likely, it does so because the question 
“Which act, φing or χing, does A have more reason to do?” is seldom 
distinguished from the question “If A had to choose between φing and χing, 
which of those acts would A have more reason to do?” If the answer to the 
second question is “φing,” people tend to give that same answer to the first 
question. This is so because the first question is seldom asked unless one of two 
things is assumed: either that A’s options are limited to φing and χing, or that 
each of those options has some reasons in its favor, meaning that A has pro 
tanto reasons to do it. If either of those assumptions is true, “φing” is the answer 
to the first question if it is the answer to the second.  
At any rate, if the answer to the second question is “φing” people tend to 
give that same answer to the first question. This is the natural knee-jerk 
response. Now suppose that “χing” stands for those acts, referred to in (17), that 
do nothing for agent A. Then the answer to the second question is “φing” if the 
(two-part) antecedent of (17) is true. (More fully, if A must choose between 
φing and χing, and if, further, φing has the virtue, and χing the shortcoming, 
mentioned in the antecedent of (17), then as long as the rest of that antecedent is 
true, A has more reason to φ than to χ.) Thus, when the antecedent of (17) is 
true one tends to give that same answer—“φing”—to the first question. That is, 
one tends to regard the consequent of (17) as true. This tendency is what makes 
(17) sound plausible.  
But as already said, (17) is false. In some situations, the antecedent of (17) 
does not preclude the possibility that although the relevant agent has a reason to 
either φ or ψ, the agent lacks a reason to φ. And if the agent lacks a reason to φ 
p. 15 
the agent cannot have more reason to φ than to do something else. Thus, despite 
its plausible ring, (17) is not true. 
6. 
It is time to sum up. The phrase “one of the best ways” is the downfall of the 
argument for (3). That phrase makes premise (2) false, and hence makes the 
argument for (3) unsound. Also, the measures which show this reveal that (4) is 
false. Thus, this paper has fulfilled its aims. First, it has exposed a fatal error in 
a tempting argument for the view that everyone, even the sociopath, has reasons 
to be moral. Second, it has exposed a further error, an easy one to make, about 
the conditions under which a desire provides reasons for the acts that fulfill it. 
To have a desire—a rational, non-misinformed desire—the satisfaction of 
which could be achieved through a certain deed is not necessarily to have a 
reason to perform that deed.  
Clearly, these errors are worth avoiding. To make them is to risk attributing 
reasons to a person that don’t really exist. Arguably, the latter include reasons 
for any sociopath to be moral. At any rate, philosophers out to show that 
everyone, even the sociopath, has reasons to be moral must use a better 
argument than the one addressed in this paper.23  
 
                                                                  
23 I thank Jason Eberl, Paul Warren, and an anonymous referee for useful remarks on an earlier draft. I 
also thank Michael Burke for some valuable chats about some of the topics addressed here.  
